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The Yale Law School has a long and distinguished tradition of interdis-
ciplinary work. In fact, sometimes its involvement with allied disciplines
has been so intensive and far-reaching as to call into question its identity
as a law school. This journal, founded by a remarkable group of students
in the Law School and the Graduate School, continues in that tradition,
but has created for itself a unique challenge-the definition of its field of
inquiry. The law has been cojoined with a discipline, or group of disci-
plines, or a perspective-"the Humanities"-that itself has no easily as-
certained boundary or content.
Academic administrators can, of course, easily define "the Humanities"
by reference to their catalogues: "the Humanities" consist of those depart-
ments which are neither part of the division of the social sciences nor the
physical and biological sciences. The inadequacy of this institutional defi-
nition of "the Humanities" becomes clear, however, when we consider the
example of "history," or even worse, "political science"-are they part of
"the Humanities," or do they belong in the social sciences? Of even
greater significance for purposes of defining the scope and mission of this
journal, is the failure of this institutional approach to disclose the method
or perspective common to the disciplines that might be bunched under the
banner of the Humanities.
In some academic circles today, it is fashionable to use the concept of
"interpretation" to define the humanistic approach and the present editors
of this journal are obviously drawn to that strategy. One cannot help but
be struck by the frequent references in their prologue to "culture" and
"meanings," and by their proclamation, "Law is an interpretive concept,
and in a world in which 'there are no facts, only interpretations' we must
grow more reflective in our examination of the meanings embedded in our
culture." In my view, however, any attempt to define "the Humanities" in
terms of interpretation risks stretching the concept of interpretation to the
point of utter distortion or possibly excluding disciplines such as philoso-
phy that must be at the core of any understanding of "the Humanities" or
of any interdisciplinary investigation of "Law and the Humanities." John
Rawls-probably the most prominent American philosopher and the one
whose work has had the greatest impact on law-has in fact (recently)
introduced contextual or historicist elements into his work, but no one
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would think that A Theory of Justice is an exercise in interpretation or a
cultural study.
In the years ahead, the editors of this journal will have to struggle with
the question of domain and definition, perhaps more so than usually is the
case. These struggles need not be endless or fruitless-they can become
the occasion for great surges of creative energy. For this to occur, how-
ever, the editors should not be ruled by any institutional definition of "the
Humanities"; nor should they search for a universal or a priori criterion,
such as "interpretation," that might be used as a boundary marker. Such
a marker probably does not exist. Instead, the emphasis should be placed
on the specific historical forces that led to the founding of this journal.
Understanding these conditions will not fix boundaries, but it will reveal
the deepest aspirations of the founding editors and thus give the journal a
thrust and direction that in the years ahead should be respected, and that
today should be celebrated.
Over the last two decades, economics has emerged as the queen of the
social sciences, or for that matter of the university. The number of stu-
dents and faculty attracted to its method and courses has grown enor-
mously. The economic model-individuals trying to maximize their wel-
fare under conditions of scarcity-now dominates a number of allied
disciplines such as history, political science, and sociology. Its influence
can even be found in philosophy, particularly in the work of those who
seek to derive principles of justice from a highly individualistic process of
rational choice.
The impact of economics has been felt in the law too, and is nowhere
more manifest than in the emergence of "Law and Economics" over the
past two decades as the interdisciplinary method for studying law. Econo-
mists are now on the faculties of all major law schools-Yale has two.
Many law professors have received advanced training in economics, and
see themselves as wholly committed to applying economics to law. Books
and articles in this genre have proliferated. Over the past decade Yale has
initiated two journals-one student edited (Journal on Regulation) and
the other faculty edited (Law, Economics and Organization)-principally
devoted to Law and Economics. A number of wealthy foundations have
established training programs in economics for judges and law professors,
and have lent their resources to this branch of interdisciplinary work be-
cause Law and Economics has helped supply the theoretical foundation
for the trend toward deregulation and privatization.
The success of Law and Economics has, in very recent years, provoked
a reaction, and the founding of this journal can be seen as part of that
reaction. (No wonder that Richard Posner, one of the leading figures in
the Law and Economics movement, has at this very moment raised his
voice against the increasing popularity of Law and Literature-an area of
interdisciplinary work which has challenged the hegemony of Law and
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Economics and one which this journal is meant to nourish.) Part of the
impetus is of course political-a desire to escape from the conservative
political thrust of Law and Economics, a thrust which, I believe, stems not
just from the individualistic orientation contained within all economic
thinking, but also from the willingness of the practitioners of Law and
Economics to see the market-bilateral exchange between two freely
choosing individuals-as the preeminent mechanism for ordering social
relations.
In this respect, the founding of Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
parallels the launching of two other student-edited journals at Yale this
year-Law & Liberation and Law and Feminism. The political impulses
behind those two journals are more explicit and perhaps more sharply
focused, but they are not different in kind from those of Law & the Hu-
manities. They are all left leaning, and thus part of the progressive and
liberal revival now taking place at Yale and perhaps at other law schools.
Though the editors of this journal avow a deep and genuine commitment
to pluralism-one buttressed by the broad reach of this inaugural is-
sue-this commitment springs forth, I believe, not from an indifference to
ideology, but from a belief that the interdisciplinary study of the law is
not the property of the right. In founding this journal, the editors seek to
alter the political direction of interdisciplinary work in the law by altering
the disciplines with which the law is allied.
But only part of the story is political, perhaps not the most important
part. The rest is theoretical. The conservative political orientation of Law
and Economics stems from its essential commitment to the market, but
that commitment itself rests on a theoretical premise which this jour-
nal-or for that matter any academic project that invokes the name "the
Humanities"-rejects, namely, that social inquiry can eradicate or ignore
value judgments. The market is not a value-generating mechanism, but
one that seeks to maximize the aggregate satisfaction of preferences (in the
sense that both the shopkeeper and the consumer are made better off by
the exchange of money for goods). Thus to claim, as the exponents of Law
and Economics do, a centrality for the market-to make "market failure"
the precondition for state intervention or to insist that such intervention
replicate the result of the well-functioning market-they must reduce val-
ues to preferences and then assume that each preference has an equal
claim to satisfaction. *Only then can social mechanisms and regulatory de-
vices-the market or law-be described in purely quantitative terms and
questions of value eliminated.
In founding this journal, and building (or rebuilding) a bridge between
the law and "the Humanities," the editors mean to restore to legal studies
a proper place for the question of values. More specifically, they mean to
contest two features of modern legal scholarship that can be traced to the
hegemony of Law and Economics scholarship. One is the heavy emphasis
[Vol. 1: v
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on instrumental or purely technocratic inquires. Once the social goal can
be agreed upon and formulated in purely quantitative terms, the central
normative task for the legal academic becomes instrumental, that is, iden-
tifying those rules or legal situations that would most likely maximize the
aggregate satisfaction of preferences. The second feature concerns the ef-
fort of Law and Economics-like economics itself-to appropriate some of
the charisma that belongs to mathematics and the physical sci-
ences-reigning monarchs of the university in the late 1950s and the
1960s. The practitioners of Law and Economics would have us believe
that the only true method for the study of law is a scientific one. This
scientific pretension-called into question by this journal-is most dra-
matically manifest in the effort of the practitioners of Law and Economics
to introduce into legal scholarship (and even into judicial opinions) the
value-less and formal language of mathematics, and to place a premium
upon purely behavioral or empirical studies, which generally presuppose
the existence of some measurable goal and a form of activity that is fully
observable and which, like rocks rolling down a hill, remains undisturbed
by observation.
To combat the instrumentalism and scientism of Law and Economics
and to restore an appropriate place for value judgments in the study of
law, one need not look outside the law and cojoin law with other disci-
plines such as literature, history, philosophy, psychiatry, which make in-
quiry into values central. One could look to law itself, as we did in the
sixties. In fact, looking outside the law is risky-interdisciplinary work
often blurs the distinctive qualities of the law, or widens the gap between
the academy and the professional, rendering legal academic inquires of
limited relevance to the practicing lawyer.
The sad fact, however, is that these days it is hard to look upon the law
alone for those purposes, especially as it is forged by a Supreme Court
that has increasingly become fascinated with separation of powers issues,
and has turned its back on the Bill of Rights, the Great Book of our legal
system. In these circumstances, interdisciplinary studies such as promised
by this journal are not gratuitous, an idle display of learning acquired
elsewhere, but an imaginative response to urgent practical needs. It is an
attempt to free contemporary law from its own barrenness.
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